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Abstract
This paper investigates the role of patent protection in the global investment decisions of
multinational firms. Using comprehensive firm-level panel data of German multinationals,
we investigate how changes in a host country’s patent protection influence the extensive
and intensive margin of foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions. We isolate the effect of
patent protection by estimating a difference-in-difference type approach and controlling for
an extensive set of fixed effects. At the extensive margin, we find that strengthening patent
protection increases the probability of locating a foreign affiliate, whereby the effect is stronger
for firms that highly depend on patent protection. The effect depends further on a host
country’s initial legal and economic development. Given that a parent has established a foreign
affiliate, no systematic effects of patent protection are found for the decision on how much to
invest in the affiliate at the intensive margin. With regard to the ownership structure, we
find that multinationals take into account the risk of intellectual property infringements and
increase the ownership share held in the foreign affiliate after strengthening patent protection.
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1. Introduction
The protection of intellectual property rights has been an important issue on the
international policy agenda. The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) has raised the concern in the political and economic debate that stronger
intellectual property rights (IPR) can slow down economic progress in developing countries by
restricting the ability of domestic firms to imitate and benefit from advanced technologies of
foreign firms. However, the proponents of stronger IPR argue that this disadvantage could be
partially offset by benefits that arise from increasing investments of multinational enterprises.
Stronger IPR could encourage multinationals to expand their scale of operations and increase
the local manufacture of technologically sophisticated goods (Branstetter et al., 2011).
For IPR reforming countries, the question whether a strengthening of local IPR protection
can attract new foreign investors or stimulate the expansion of existing investments is of
high importance for assessing the costs and benefits of IPR reforms. The aim of the present
paper is therefore to empirically examine the second argument, i.e., whether IPR protection
affects the global investment decisions of multinationals. We thereby focus on patent law and
contribute to a better understanding of how strengthening patent protection affects inward FDI
in reforming countries. Using a firm-level panel dataset on the universe of German outward
FDI, we investigate individual firm-level investment decisions at the extensive and intensive
margins. At the extensive margin, we explore the impact of patent protection on the decision
where to locate a foreign affiliate. At the intensive margin, we analyze how the strengthening
of patent rights affects the size of foreign affiliates and the ownership share held in these
affiliates.
For the analysis, we use rich firm-level panel data of German multinationals and their
foreign affiliates from the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) conducted by the Deutsche
Bundesbank. MiDi is a comprehensive yearly database that gathers location and balance sheet
information on German foreign affiliates and on affiliates of foreign investors in Germany.
By law, German firms are required to report yearly on their foreign direct investments
when particular thresholds regarding ownership participation and balance sheet totals of
foreign affiliates are exceeded. To measure the local strength of patent protection, we use
the Ginarte-Park index (Ginarte and Park, 1997; Park, 2008). This index approximates the
strength of patent protection across 110 countries between 1960 and 2005. It considers the
categories coverage, membership in international treaties, duration of protection, enforcement
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mechanisms and provisions for loss of patent protection.
To isolate the effect of patent protection, we exploit variation of patent protection across
countries and time, as well as variation of the dependence on patent protection across sectors
and time. Conditioning on an extensive set of fixed effects, we account for unobserved
firm- and country-specific heterogeneity and capture potential omitted variable bias. The key
explanatory variable is the interaction term between host countries’ patent protection and the
sectoral patent dependence of the parent, which allows for nonlinear effects of patent reforms.
Patent reforms in countries with high initial levels of protection are expected to impose
different effects than patent reforms in countries with weak or no protection. Similarly,
depending on a country’s previous level of economic development, changes in patent law
could exert different effects. Therefore, we additionally add triple interaction terms that allow
the effect of patent protection to further vary with a country’s pre-reform patent protection
and level of economic development.
Our empirical analysis shows that patent protection affects the foreign investment
decisions of German multinationals in different ways. First, reforms of the patent system
positively affect the location decision of German multinationals. This effect is strongest for
firms in sectors that highly depend on patent protection. Moreover, significant nonlinear
effects in a host country’s initial patent protection and economic development are found.
After strengthening patent protection, countries with an already sufficient patent protection
experience the highest increase in their location advantage. Further, the results show that
countries starting from a low level of economic development also disproportionately attract
FDI by reforming their patent system. Second, regarding the intensive margin, we find some
evidence for a positive effect of patent protection. However, the effect is much weaker than
for the location decision. Given that a foreign affiliate is established, changes in patent reforms
play a minor role on the size of the affiliate. Third, we find that firms take into account a
higher risk of patent infringement by adapting the capital structure of the foreign affiliate:
average ownership shares increase significantly after strengthening patent protection.
The paper complements the literature on the relation between IPR and FDI. A rich
theoretical literature has investigated the global effect of IPR protection.1 In a seminal work,
Helpman (1993) shows in a dynamic general equilibrium model of two regions, the innovative
1Branstetter et al. (2011) provide a detailed discussion of the theoretical literature.
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North and the imitative South, that the latter never benefits from stronger IPR protection.
Extensions by Lai (1998) and Branstetter et al. (2006), which allow for endogenous responses in
FDI, innovation or imitation activities, provide conditions under which a strengthening of IPR
protection increases the industrial development of the South. In their models, the total effect
depends on whether an increase in northern FDI compensates for the decrease in southern
imitation activities.2
Previous empirical studies on international trade and FDI mainly relied on aggregated
country- or industry-level data and have led to mixed conclusions.3 However, high
correlations between IPR protection and other omitted host country characteristics as well
as no time variation constitute common problems of cross-country studies and provide
explanations for the ambiguous results.
A recently growing empirical literature uses firm-level data to examine how IPR protection
affects the global investment decisions of individual multinationals. The following recent
studies are particularly relevant to this work. Branstetter et al. (2011) investigate the impact
of patent reforms in 16 countries on the investment behavior of U.S. multinationals and
show a positive effect on the intensive margin of FDI, i.e., the size of foreign affiliates.
They find that parents that intensively license technologies increase their foreign investments
disproportionately. Furthermore, using the same sample, Branstetter et al. (2006) show that
patent reforms stimulate the transfer of technology to reforming countries. Using time- and
country-specific variations in the Ginarte-Park patent index, Bilir (2011) confirms a positive
effect of patent protection on the FDI of U.S. multinationals. She shows that the effect is
strongest for firms that are active in sectors with long product lifecycle lengths and therefore
rely more on patent protection. Javorcik (2004) finds a positive effect of patent protection on
FDI in technologically intensive sectors for transition countries. Moreover, she demonstrates
that strong IPR protection encourages multinational enterprises to invest in local manufacture
rather than in the distribution of goods.
This paper is also related to the literature that examines how political risk in general
influences the capital structure decisions of multinationals. Kesternich and Schnitzer (2010)
2In this literature, the South can gain access to new technology through FDI or imitation. Yang and Maskus
(2001a) additionally allow for licensing as a third channel for technology transfer and show theoretically that
stronger IPR can raise technology transfer to the South. Yang and Maskus (2001b) provide empirical evidence
that licensing activities are more likely to take place in countries with strong IPR protection.
3Maskus (2000) provides a detailed discussion of previous empirical analysis based on aggregated data. See,
e.g., Ferrantino (1993), Lee and Mansfield (1996), Maskus and Penubarti (1995), and Smith (1999).
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provide theoretical and empirical evidence that local political risk adversely affects the capital
structure of foreign affiliates in terms of ownership. The optimal ownership share decreases
with higher political risk, since expected returns are reduced, while the managerial costs of
running the affiliate are unaffected.
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we provide a strong
identification strategy that allows for nonlinear effects of patent protection and considers
various sources of omitted variable bias. The identification is based on variation in patent
protection across countries and time as well as on variation in patent sensitivities across
sectors and time. Additionally, we also take into account variation on host countries’
previous levels of legal and economic development, which enables us to draw more precise
policy recommendations for reforming countries. We show that the identified effects of
patent protection are robust to the inclusion of country-time fixed effects, which absorb all
observed and unobserved time-varying country characteristics. Second, the paper provides a
comprehensive analysis of FDI decisions. It decomposes the various levels of FDI decisions of
multinationals, namely decisions on location, size and ownership structure, something which
has been missing in the previous analysis.4 Third, this paper provides the first firm-level
evidence on German multinationals. Insights into how German multinationals are affected
by international patent protection are particularly interesting because German firms play an
important role in international FDI outflows. With a total FDI outflow of 105 billion USD in
2010, Germany is second largest in the ranking of FDI outward countries (UNCTAD, 2011). A
systematic analysis of German multinationals has not yet existed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical strategy
and presents the empirical model. Section 3 provides a detailed description of the data sources
used in the analysis and presents the descriptive statistics. The results are discussed in Section
4. Section 5 reports various robustness checks and Section 6 concludes.
2. Empirical Specification
2.1. Identification
The impact of patent protection on foreign direct investment decisions is investigated along
three dimensions: the location decisions of German multinationals, the size of the investment
4The analysis by Bilir (2011) provides for the first time a joint analysis on the extensive margin (industry-level)
and intensive margin (firm-level) of FDI.
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and the ownership structure. Varieties of the following baseline specification will be estimated
for the different levels of the investment decision.
FDIict = β1PATc,t−1 + β2PATc,t−1 ∗ PATDEPit + γXc,t−1 + δYi,t (1)
+ ηi + ηc + ηt + λict
where FDIict is a measure of the global investment activity of firm i in country c during year
t, PATc,t−1 captures the patent protection in country c at year t − 1, and PATDEPit represents
different sectoral measures of firms’ sensitivity to patent protection.
To establish a causal effect, different potential issues need to be addressed. Most
importantly, one might be concerned that the level of patent protection could be correlated
with unobserved host country characteristics that influence FDI decisions, which could lead
to omitted variable bias. To guard against omitted variable bias, we condition on an extensive
set of fixed effects. Country fixed effects ηc capture time-invariant country characteristics such
as legal origin, language and geography (including distance and natural resources). These
time-constant heterogeneities are expected to influence foreign direct investment decisions and
can simultaneously be correlated with the level of patent protection. Further, time dummies
ηt are included to absorb the impact of common shocks that affect host countries in a similar
manner over time.
To additionally take into account country-specific dynamics of potential FDI determinants,
various time-varying host country covariates Xc,t−1 are included. We control for changes in
the statutory corporate tax rates, changes in the school system (approximating human capital;
measured by the share of pupils that progress to secondary school), changes in the GDP per
capita (approximating trends in market attractiveness), and changes in the host country’s
exports (capturing strategic platform motives). Furthermore, indexes for general rule of law
and the overall openness to trade are included to capture general reforms of the legal system
and altering trade barriers.5 All country-specific variables are lagged once.
Moreover, parent fixed effects ηi are included to capture firm-specific heterogeneities, and
5The corporate tax rate data is taken from various issues of the corporate tax guides of PriceWaterhouseCoopers,
KPMG, Coopers&Lybrand, Ernst&Young, and information from the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation
(IBFD). Country data on GDP per capita, the school system and exports (exports of goods and services as a share
of of GDP) are taken from the World Bank Development Indicator. The indexes on the rule of lae and trade
freedom are obtained from the Heritage Foundation. The definitions of the variables are summarized in Table
C.1 in Appendix 7.
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in particular unobserved firm-specific differences, such as risk aversion or business practices,
that are expected to strongly correlate with a firm’s investment decisions. Note that parent
fixed effects capture fixed industry-specific differences as well as time constant ownership
links to holding firms. To capture differences in parent-specific time-varying effects such
as different growth rates, we in addition include a parent’s productivity measured by the
logarithm of the ratio of sales over employees.
A further factor that could interfere with identification is the possibility that patent reforms
can be accompanied by simultaneous institutional reforms. Consequently, changes in FDI
behavior following patent reforms would then not be fully attributable to a better legal
protection of patents. Exploiting variation across reforming countries as well as variation
across sectors with varying levels of sensitivity to patent protection allows to isolate the effect
of patent reforms from that of other potentially confounding factors.6 The index of patent
protection is therefore interacted with measures of the industry-specific dependence on patent
protection. Since not all companies rely equally intensely on patent protection, the influence
of patent reforms on a firm’s investment decision is expected to be heterogeneous.
We explore two different measures that reflect the sensitivity to patent protection: R&D
intensity (R&D) and the perceived effectiveness of patents for protecting inventions (PATEFF).
The industry-specific R&D intensity provides continuous time-varying approximations for
the sensitivity to patent protection at the parent sector-level. A higher intensity in
R&D accompanies a higher rate of innovations, resulting in a greater need to protect
inventions against imitations. To directly measure the dependence on the patent system,
the industry-specific perception of the effectiveness of patent protection is taken from Cohen
et al. (2000). This measure takes into account the relative importance of patents for protecting
inventions compared to other protection strategies, such as secrecy.7 In the related literature,
e.g., measures of industry-specific product cycle lengths (Bilir, 2011), technology licensing
(Branstetter et al., 2011) and patent usage (Branstetter et al., 2006) have been used to allow
6This difference-in-difference type approach can be found, e.g., in Rajan and Zingales (1998), Chor and Manova
(2012) and Manova (2013), where interactions between sector-specific measures of financial vulnerability are used
to isolate the effect of country-specific financial development. Bilir (2011) uses sector-specific variations in product
cycle lengths to strengthen the identification of the effect of patent protection.
7The perception-based measure PATEFF is taken from a survey of U.S. manufacturing firms. This time constant
information refers to the year 1994, so before the changes in patent law that we investigate in this analysis. PATEFF
should therefore be clearly exogenous to patent reforms in particular host countries. The measure of R&D intensity
refers to German industries. Thereby, national and international German firms are considered. The aggregated
information on German firms should be not systematically related to changes in patent protection of particular
foreign countries.
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for nonlinear effects of patent protection. A detailed description of the measures can be found
in Section 3.2.
Furthermore, one would expect the effect of strengthening patent protection to depend
on the initial level of protection. It could make a difference whether a reform takes place
in a country with an already high initial level of patent protection or whether it takes place
in a country with a minimal or no protection. The same applies to different levels of
economic development. An patent reforming country with a very low level of economic
development might not attract FDI in the same manner as a highly developed reforming
country. Triple interaction terms (PATc,t−1 ∗ PATDEPit ∗ Low/High Levelc) allow the effect to
further differ according to whether the country falls in the lowest (highest) 25th percentile of
patent protection within all included countries (analogue for GDP per capita).8
Finally, the main variables of interest are the double and triple interaction terms. The
coefficient of PATc,t−1 ∗ PATDEPit, β2 estimates the effect of changes in host countries’ strength
of patent protection over time on the investment behavior of German multinationals. β2
is identified from the variation in patent protection across countries, the variation in patent
protection over time within a country, and the variation in patent sensitivity across and within
sectors. The coefficients of the triple interaction terms are additionally identified from variation
in the initial levels of patent protection and economic development across countries.
2.2. Estimating Equations
Location Decision. To investigate the location decision of German multinationals, we follow
Javorcik (2004) and inflate the dataset by all observable host countries, such that each parent
firm could have invested in each host country within each time period. The number of
observations equals the number of parents times the number of host countries in each year.
The binary variable yict equals 1 if parent i holds an affiliate in host country c in year t. We
specify the following linear probability model
Pr(yict = 1) = β1PATc,t−1 + β2PATc,t−1 ∗ PATDEPit + γXc,t−1 + δYi,t (2)
+ ηi + ηc + ηt + λict
8The relative position of a country is determined at the first year of the sample. This avoids that a country
changes its relative position over time due to other countries’ patent reforms or increases in GDP per capita, without
implementing own improvements.
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where ηi captures parent fixed effects that account for time-invariant firm-specific
characteristics, ηc time-constant host country fixed effects and ηt year fixed effects. The vector
Xc,t−1 summarizes time-varying host country covariates (lagged once), Yi,t the time-varying
parent-level controls.
A linear probability model has the advantage of not requiring a distributional assumption
regarding the firm-specific unobserved effects ηi. An independence assumption on the
responses (yic1,...,yicT) conditional on the explanatory variables and the unobserved effect is
further not necessary (Wooldridge, 2010). Since the identification is based on an extensive set
of fixed effects, many dummies have to be included in the regression. In maximum likelihood
estimations of nonlinear models this could introduce an incidental parameters problem, which
can result in inconsistent estimations of all coefficients, while in linear regression models the
slope estimator is unbiased and consistent (Greene, 2008, p.587). Therefore, a linear probability
model is preferable in this setting. Furthermore, linear probability models allow to directly
interpret the marginal effects of the interaction terms, which are of main interest in this study.9
In a robustness check, the location decision is re-estimated with nonlinear fixed effects models.
Standard errors are clustered on the parent-level to account for heteroskedasticity and serial
dependence in the firm-level panel data.10
Size of Investment. For the intensive margin of FDI, we investigate how patent protection
influences the size of foreign affiliates, given that a multinational has invested in a specific
country. The basic specification takes the form
Sizeijt = β1PATc,t−1 + β2PATc,t−1 ∗ PATDEPit + γXc,t−1 + δYi,t (3)
+ ηi + ηc + ηt + λict,
where i indexes the parent, j the foreign affiliate, c the country and t the year. The variable
Sizeijt contains the alternative size measures Log(FDI), Log(Sales) and Log(Employees). In all
specifications, we include dummies for the affiliate age and sector.11
9This is not straightforward in nonlinear models, see Ai and Norton (2003) for a detailed discussion.
10Clustering on country-level does not affect the results of the key variables concerning patent protection and
leads to the same conclusions.
11Unfortunately, direct information on the year of foundation is not available. Instead, we approximate an
affiliate’s age with the number of years since the affiliate has entered the dataset.
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Ownership Structure. In the global investment decision of multinationals, the influence of
patent protection on the composition of the FDI is of particular interest. Multinational firms
can adapt the ownership structure of their foreign affiliates to respond to country specific risks
that affect the expected profitability of their investments. We estimate
Ownershipijt = β1PATc,t−1 + β2PATc,t−1 ∗ PATDEPit + γXc,t−1 + δYi,t + eZijct (4)
+ ηi + ηc + ηt + λict
where Ownershipijt is the share of the affiliate’s equity held by the German parent. The vector
Zijct captures time-varying affiliate characteristics that are expected to influence the ownership
structure. Following Kesternich and Schnitzer (2010), we include an affiliate’s fixed over total
assets, log(sales), and profits over total assets as additional control variables. Further, dummies
for an affiliate’s sector and age are included.
3. Data
The empirical analysis requires a time-varying measure of patent protection that ideally
covers all potential host countries, proxies for the sectors’ sensitivity to patent protection, and
detailed firm-level data on multinational activities across countries and time. In the following,
the data sources used are described in detail and the descriptive statistics are presented.
3.1. Patent Protection Across Countries
Ginarte and Park (1997) provide an index of patent protection, which has been widely
used in the literature.12 That index has been updated by Park (2008) and covers 110 countries
for 1960-2005, surveyed every five years. It documents the strength of patent rights in five
categories: extent of coverage, membership in international patent agreements, duration
of protection, enforcement mechanisms, and provisions for loss of patent protection. The
categories are scored with values ranging from 0 to 1 and an unweighted sum is constructed,
so that the index varies between 0 and 5 (for details, see Park, 2008; Ginarte and Park, 1997).
Table C.2 in Appendix 7 summarizes the patent protection across the host countries in the
sample for 1996-2006. Across countries, the average patent protection varies between 1.41
(Guyana) and 4.88 (USA). Between the years 1996 and 2006, many countries introduced a
12See, e.g., Kumar (2001), Javorcik (2004), Branstetter et al. (2006), Falvey et al. (2006), Qian (2007) and Bilir (2011).
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minimum protection level or strengthened their existing patent laws, such that the global
average protection level increased over time from 2.78 to 3.57. In the entire panel the index
has a mean of 3.24 and a standard deviation of 1.03.
For robustness, we also use a perception-based measure of IPR protection provided by
the World Economic Forum. This measure is available for 98 countries with yearly values
for 2005-2009. A potential disadvantage of this measure is that it covers a relative short time
period and does not include observations from the 90s, when major reforms took place (see
Section 5.3).
3.2. Sensitivity to Patent Protection Across Sectors
Two different measures for a firm’s sensitivity to patent protection are explored. First,
information on the R&D intensity is taken from the Centre for European Economic Research
(ZEW). The measure is based on the proportion of expenditures for innovation over total sales
and provides a continuous time-varying measure of the R&D intensities of German industries.
Firms in industries with high R&D intensities exhibit, on average, a higher rate of innovation,
which goes along with a greater need to protect inventions against imitations.
Second, a perception-based measure of the dependence on patent protection is taken from
the survey of Cohen et al. (2000). This survey is based on a sample of U.S. manufacturing
firms for the year 1994, in which firms were asked how effective they perceived patents to be
at protecting their innovation. The important difference with regard to R&D intensity is that
some industries, depending on the type of invention, more often prefer not to file a patent
application and thereby disclose sensitive information, but to strategically keep inventions
secret. However, it has to be assumed that the perceptions of firms from the respective German
sector are sufficiently correlated and that the ranking across sectors is relatively stable over
time. Otherwise the measure would contain a lot of noise or even no information and the
estimated coefficient would be biased towards zero. The measures for the sensitivity to patent
protection for the 29 included industries (mainly matched at the 2-digit level of the NACE 1
industry code) are listed in Table C.3 in Appendix 7.
3.3. German Outward FDI
The analysis is based on the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) provided by the
Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank). It constitutes a comprehensive dataset, since
German parents are required by law to report on their foreign investments if certain thresholds
10
on balance-sheet totals and ownership shares are exceeded (Lipponer, 2006). For this research
yearly firm-level panel data on German multinationals and their foreign affiliates for the years
1996-2010 were used.
The research interest lies in direct outward FDI, such that observations on outward FDI that
constitute ownership chains of dependent affiliates are excluded. Reporting thresholds have
been changed several times during the covered time period, influencing the composition of
the sampled firms. To harmonize the sample between years, the strictest reporting threshold
is considered, such that only parents with a participation share of at least 50 percent and a
balance sheet total of 3 million EUR are included.13 Furthermore, the analysis concentrates on
parents from manufacturing sectors, since information on patent sensitivity is mainly available
for these sectors. Since the patent protection index is available in five-year intervals, data
can be matched for the years 1996, 2001 and 2006. Thereby, 84 of 138 destination countries
for German multinational can be matched, covering 89 percent of total outward FDI of the
considered multinationals in the sampled years. The final sample comprises 2,726 individual
German parents which hold in total 12,152 foreign affiliates in 84 different destination countries
(see Table 1). Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for all variables.
Table 1: Sample characteristics
Year # Parents # Affiliates # Destinations
1996 1,342 2,954 39
2001 1,781 4,689 67
2006 1,509 4,509 74
Total 2,726 12,152 84
Figure 1 presents scatter plots for the dependent variables.14 The first graph illustrates
the relation between patent protection and the logarithm of the number of German affiliates
in a host country. There is a positive and convex relation. The better the patent protection,
the more German affiliates are localized in a host country. The next three graphs present
how the mean of the size measures Log(Sales), Log(FDI) and Log(Employees) varies with patent
protection. Countries with a better patent protection host on average larger affiliates with
13Before 1999, the reporting threshold was an ownership share of more than 20 percent and a balance sheet total
of more than 1 million DM, for 1999-2002 an ownership share of 50 percent or more and a balance sheet total of
more than 1 million DM (10-50 percent for more than 10 million DM) and since 2002 an ownership share of 10
percent or more and a balance sheet total of more than 3 million EUR. See Lipponer (2006) for more details.
14Due to the confidentiality of the data, only information on host countries with affiliates from at least three
different parent firms are used for the graphs.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean St Dev Min Max
Parent-level
Productivity 5.78 1.34 0.79 12.71
R&D 3.52 2.41 0.35 8.96
PATEFF 34.96 9.03 12.08 50.20
Affiliate-level
Ownership 0.93 0.15 0.50 1.00
Log(Sales) 7.99 4.78 -4.60 16.33
Log(FDI) 8.69 1.46 0.15 17.08
Log(Employees) 3.21 3.04 -4.60 11.22
Fixed/Total Assets 0.24 0.25 0.00 1.00
Profitability 0.04 0.14 -1.42 1.18
Country-level
PAT 3.27 0.99 0.00 4.88
Log(GDPpc) 8.14 1.60 4.16 11.30
Corporate Tax 29.92 8.75 0 60
Schooling 33.81 23.02 0.46 93.49
Exports 43.64 29.69 7.26 229.68
Rule of Law 55.22 22.63 10 90
Trade Openness 66.20 14.68 0 90
Notes: All min (max) values refer to averages of the three smallest (largest)
firms. The number of firms for the smallest (largest) category is increased,
if the standard devition is equal to zero for the three firms. The definitions
of the variables are summarized in Table C.1.
higher sales amounts. With regard to the number of employees, no clear relation appears. The
last graph presents the relation between average ownership shares of foreign affiliates and
patent protection. Although high ownership shares can be found in countries at all levels of
patent protection, the highest values are concentrated in countries with strong protection. To
study the above observed patterns more precisely, multivariate regressions are presented in
the following.
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Figure 1: Scatter plots of the dependent variables
13
4. Results
The aim of the analysis is to investigate the effect of patent protection on various
dimensions of FDI. This section presents the multivariate regressions on the decision where
to locate a foreign affiliate and, given that an affiliate has been established, the decisions how
much to invest, and how to set the ownership share of the affiliate.
4.1. Location Decision
Table 3 presents the results for the location decision. The coefficient of PAT in the
specification without interactions (Column 1) is positive and significant. A strengthening
of patent protection by one standard deviation (1.03) is associated with an on average 1.25
percentage points higher probability of locating a foreign affiliate. Furthermore, GDP per
capita, the quality of the schooling system, the connectedness to the world (in terms of exports)
and higher trade freedom are also found to significantly attract German FDI, while a higher
tax rate reduces the probability of affiliate location.
Since identification is stronger when allowing for nonlinear effects of patent protection,
Columns 2 and 3 present interactions between PAT and the measures of patent sensitivity. Both
coefficients of the interaction terms are significantly positive and indicate a strong nonlinear
relation that increases with the industry-specific sensitivity for patent protection. An increase
in patent protection by one standard deviation increases the probability of having located a
foreign affiliate by 1.80 percentage points (with PATEFF) and 0.73 percentage points (with
R&D) for an average firm. The direct measure of patent sensitivity quantifies a stronger effect
of patent protections.
With regard to the parent explanatory variables, we find that a higher productivity of the
parent increases the general probability of FDI. This is in line with theoretical predictions that
a productivity cut off exists.15 Further, firms active in industries with high R&D intensities
generally less often invest abroad.16
Table 4 summarizes the results for the triple interactions that allow the effect of patent
reforms to further vary with a country’s initial level of patent protection or economic
development. The elasticity to patent reforms significantly differs with the initial level of
15See, e.g., Melitz (2003) for the role of firm productivity in international trade and Helpman et al. (2004) for FDI
and exports.
16Note, that the measure PATEFF is time invariant and is therefore captured in the parent FE effect.
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Table 3: Location decision
Dependent variable: Location
(1) (2) (3)
Productivity 0.0102∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0013)
Log(GDPpc) 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0233∗∗∗ 0.0234∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023)
Corporate Tax -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Schooling 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Exports 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Rule of Law -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Trade Openness 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
PAT 0.0121∗∗∗ -0.0039 0.0036
(0.0015) (0.0030) (0.0025)
PAT*PATEFF 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001)
PAT*R&D 0.0020∗∗∗
(0.0004)
R&D -0.0078∗∗∗
(0.0018)
Observations 284523 261434 275373
Indiv. Parents 2726 2490 2630
Destinations 84 84 84
Adjusted R2 0.1897 0.1944 0.1929
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by parent firm, with ***, **, *
denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The
dependent variable is the binary location variable yict that equals 1 if
parent i holds an affiliate in host country c in year t. All specifications
include country, year and parent fixed effects.
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patent protection. Reforming countries with an already high patent protection level (upper 25
percentile) are able to attract more FDI than countries with a low or middle level of protection.
With regard to the initial level of economic development, we observe a U-shaped relation.
The previously observed pattern that more patent sensitive firms have a higher elasticity
to patent reforms remains robust in all specifications. In comparison to countries with an
average initial development level (25 to 75 percentile), we find additional positive effects of
strengthening patent protection for low developed countries (lowest 25 percentile) as well as
for high developed countries.
Table 4: Location decision with heterogeneity in initial host country characteristics
Dependent variable: Location
Triple interaction with: Initial PAT Initial GDPpc
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Productivity 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013)
Log(GDPpc) 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0242∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0226∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023)
Corporate Tax -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Schooling 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Exports 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Property Rights -0.0001 -0.0001∗∗ -0.0001∗∗ -0.0001∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Trade Openness 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
PAT 0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗ 0.0040∗
(0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0023)
PAT*PATEFF 0.0001 0.0001∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
PAT*PATEFF*Low Level 0.0000 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
PAT*PATEFF*High Level 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
PAT*R&D 0.0009∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004)
PAT*R&D*Low Level 0.0003∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002)
PAT*R&D*High Level 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002)
R&D -0.0049∗∗∗ -0.0075∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0017)
Observations 261434 275373 261434 275373
Indiv. Parents 2490 2630 2490 2630
Destinations 84 84 84 84
Adjusted R2 0.1949 0.1931 0.1951 0.1933
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by parent firm, with ***, **, * denoting
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The dependent variable is the
binary location variable yict that equals 1 if parent i holds an affiliate in host country
c in year t. All specifications include country, year and parent fixed effects.
4.2. Size of Investment
The estimations for the size measures Log(FDI), Log(Sales) and Log(Employees) are
summarized in Table 5. Regarding patent protection, the results for the intensive margins
16
of FDI are much weaker than for the extensive margin. In the baseline regressions without
interaction terms (Columns 1, 4 and 7) a significant positive effect of patent protection is
found for affiliate’s sales and employees. When including interaction terms between PAT and
patent sensitivity, a significant effect is found with PATEFF for Log(FDI), while the coefficients
in the other specifications are not significant. Taken together with the previous results, this
suggests that patent protection plays a major role for the location decision, while, given that a
multinational has established a foreign affiliate, it seems to play a minor role for the scope of
the investment.
Instead, the most important determinant for the intensive margin of FDI is GDP per
capita. Given that a firm is located in a specific host country, raises in the GDP per capita
significantly increase affiliate size. A host country’s tax rates and schooling system are not
found to influence an affiliate’s size. Similar to PAT, these determinants are found to have
major importance for the location decision, but given location, they seem not to influence the
decision on the size of the investment. Interestingly, exports are found to have a significant and
positive effect on the number of employees, such that platform motives are found to influence
the extensive and intensive margins of FDI. However, with regard to Log(Sales) or Log(FDI),
no such relation is found. Better terms of trade freedom are associated with higher FDI and
more employees in foreign affiliates. Rule of law has a significant negative, but small effect.
However, identification in the fixed effect model is based on time variation and since rule of
law does not change much over time, this could explain the contradictory results.
4.3. Ownership Structure
The analysis on how the capital structure in terms of ownership share reacts to changes in
patent protection is presented in Table 6. A lack of patent protection goes along with a higher
risk of patent infringements and can be seen as a form of political risk. An increase in patent
protection, which is associated with a reduction in political risk, leads to an overall increase in
the ownership shares of foreign affiliates held by German parents. This confirms the results
of Kesternich and Schnitzer (2010) that provide evidence that multinationals adapt the capital
structure of their foreign affiliates with respect to local political risk and reduce their ownership
shares in high-risk host countries. The results extend the literature by providing first empirical
evidence for political risk in terms of patent infringement.
However, the nonlinear effects of patent sensitivity, which would provide a more reliable
17
identification, are not significantly different from zero. One limitation of the analysis that
might affect the results is that much variation of the ownership structure is not captured, since
only firms with participation shares above the required threshold are required to report on
their FDI.17
17In an alternative estimation, we ignored the harmonization problem of our sample and estimated the
determinants of the ownership share with all available observations of foreign affiliates. However, the results
did not change.
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Table 6: Ownership share of foreign affiliates
Dependent variable: Ownership Share
(1) (2) (3)
Productivity -0.0008 -0.0024 -0.0013
(0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0031)
Log(Sales) 0.0032 0.0038 0.0032
(0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0028)
Profitability -0.0286∗ -0.0241 -0.0298∗
(0.0160) (0.0178) (0.0163)
Fix/Total Assets -0.0149 -0.0148 -0.0140
(0.0155) (0.0163) (0.0156)
Log(GDPpc) -0.0168 -0.0173 -0.0191
(0.0146) (0.0153) (0.0146)
Corporate Tax -0.0012∗ -0.0012 -0.0012∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Schooling -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Exports -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Rule of Law -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Trade Openness 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
PAT 0.0275∗∗∗ 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0293∗∗
(0.0083) (0.0107) (0.0128)
PAT*PATEFF -0.0001
(0.0002)
PAT*R&D -0.0007
(0.0024)
R&D 0.0069
(0.0112)
Observations 11187 10330 10904
Indiv. Parents 2615 2393 2525
Destinations 73 72 73
Adjusted R2 0.3148 0.3137 0.3164
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by parent firm, with ***, **,
* denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
All specifications include country, year and parent fixed effects.
Additionally, dummies for an affiliate’s age and sector are
included.
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5. Sensitivity Analysis
5.1. Estimation with Country-Year Fixed Effects
To rule out that other changes in a country beyond patent protection are influencing
the results, we include time-varying country-year fixed effects. These fixed effects capture
all observable and unobservable time-varying components and control for potential omitted
time-varying factors at the country level. All changes in the country-specific explanatory
variables are adsorbed, including changes in patent protection, such that only the coefficient
on the interaction between patent protection and patent sensitivity can be identified in these
specifications. Table C.4 to C.6 present the results for location, size and ownership. The results
for the interaction terms remain very robust and strengthen our previous findings in the basis
estimations. These findings indicate, that no omitted time-varying factors interfere with the
estimated effect of patent protection.
5.2. Identification of Patent Reforms
To strengthen the identification, different measures of the sensitivity to patent protection
have been interacted with PAT, which allows for nonlinear effects of patent protection and
provides additional industry-level variation. A concern might still be that the estimated
effects could capture reforms of general legal institutions. To verify whether the methodology
identifies the effects of changes in patent law alone, we carry out a falsification test and interact
PAT with a measure of the industry-specific importance of secrecy for protecting inventions.
Similarly to patent sensitivity, a measure of the effectiveness of secrecy is expected to be
positively correlated with industry-specific technological complexity. Yet, additional variation
occurs due to industry-specific differences in the patentability of inventions and business
practices in protecting innovations. Depending on the type of invention, keeping an invention
secret could be preferable to filing a patent and thereby disclosing sensitive information. Most
importantly, the degree of reliance on secrecy should not directly depend on formal patent
law, which provides no protection for secrecy. If the effect of PAT is correctly identified from
changes in patent law alone, the coefficient of an interaction term between secrecy and PAT
should be insignificant. By contrast, a significant coefficient would indicate that changes in
general legal institutions are not disentangled and could influence the results.18
18An alternative explanation for a significant effect could also be that secrecy is, due to the expected correlation
with technological complexity, highly correlated with patent sensitivity. However, this would work against the
21
Table C.7 in Appendix 7 summarizes the estimations for all FDI dimensions with an
interaction term between PAT and a measure of secrecy, which is also taken from the survey
of Cohen et al. (2000). Firms that greatly rely on secrecy as a protection strategy do not change
their investment behavior due to changes in patent law. For the location decision, where patent
protection was found to play the most important role, the interaction term is not significant.
Similarly, for all size specifications, no significant effect is found. Only in the ownership
regression a weakly significant (at the ten percent level) coefficient is found for the interaction
term, indicating that after a reduction of political risk in the form of PAT infringement, parents
with a high sensitivity for secrecy increase their ownership share in their affiliates.
5.3. Alternative Measurement of IPR Protection
A concern regarding the Ginarte-Park patent protection index may be that it covers mainly
law on the books and does not fully capture the de facto strength of enforcement.19 To account
for that potential limitation, we estimate the basis regressions with a perception-based measure
of IPR protection (PERC-IPR). This index is provided by the World Economic Forum and is
available for 98 countries with yearly values for 2005-2009. It assesses the overall strength of
IPR protection at a scale from 1 to 7, with higher values indicating better protection. The index
considers patent, copyright and trademark law and is much broader than the Ginarte-Park
index, which focuses on patent rights. It has the advantage that it also captures problems in
the enforcement of law. A disadvantage of this index is, however, that it covers a relatively
short time period that does not include observations from the 90s. Consequently, important
variation is missing, which could weaken the identification.
Appendix Tables C.8 - C.10 replicate the baseline results with the perception-based IPR
index. The underlying firm-level sample covers the years 2006-2010, since the host country
variables are lagged once. In the location decision, the results for PERC-IPR are similar
to the estimations with the Ginarte-Park index. The coefficients of the interaction terms
between PERC-IPR and the patent sensitivity measures are positive and significant. In the
size regressions, the coefficients of PERC-IPR and its interaction terms are, similar to the
estimations with the Ginarte-Park index, mainly not significant. For ownership, the general
positive effect of patent protection is confirmed only in the specification with the interaction
falsification test.
19However, enforcement mechanism on the books are considered in the Ginarte-Park index.
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between PERC-IPR and R&D. However, the effect is smaller for R&D intensive firms. The net
effect after an increase in the PERC-IPR index by one unit is an increase of 0.75 percentage
points in the ownership share for the average parent. R&D intensive firms seem to be more
cautious in increasing their ownership shares after a strengthening of IPR protection.
5.4. Nonlinear Estimation of the Location Decision
In the baseline specification, the location decision is estimated with a linear probability
model. This has the advantage that no additional assumptions regarding the unobserved
effect ηi and the responses (yic1,...,yicT) are necessary and an incidental parameter problem
that can occur in a maximum likelihood estimation with an extensive set of dummy variables
is avoided. However, as a robustness check, the location decision is re-estimated with a
nonlinear conditional logit model, which takes into account the binary nature of the dependent
variable. Table C.11 summarizes the results, whereby estimations without country fixed effects
(Columns 1-3) and with country fixed effects (Columns 4-6) are presented to assess the severity
of any potential incidental parameter problem.
In the specifications without country fixed effects, strengthening patent protection has a
positive and significant effect on the probability of locating a foreign affiliate in a reforming
country. In contrast to the linear probability estimations (see Table 3), the coefficients of PAT
remain positive and significant when interaction terms are included. For all interaction terms,
we find positive effects. In the specifications with country fixed effects, we find a positive effect
of PAT in the basic specification without interaction terms and a significant positive effect for
the interaction with patent effectiveness.
Comparing the results for the host country controls reveals how important country fixed
effects are for the identification, since many coefficients change sign when country fixed effects
are included. Since the incidental parameter problem is very likely with the extensive set of
fixed effects, our preferred estimation model is the linear probability model.
6. Conclusions
The present paper analyzes how national patent protection influences various levels in
the global investment decisions of German multinationals. In particular, we show that
patent protection is a significant factor in attracting technologically sophisticated FDI, since
strengthening patent protection increases the probability of locating a foreign affiliate in a
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reforming country, especially so for R&D intensive and firms that are sensitive to patent
protection. This has important policy implications for host countries, as the attraction of FDI
can contribute to technology spillovers and foster domestic growth.
Moreover, we show that the effect of patent reforms differs with a host country’s pre-reform
characteristics. With regard to the initial level of patent protection, we find the strongest
effects for countries with an already sufficient pre-reform patent protection. Evidence that
a too high patent protection could distort FDI has not been found. With regard to the initial
level of economic development, we find the effect of patent reforms is significantly positive
at all stages of economic development. However, reforming countries with a relatively high
level of economic development exhibit stronger effects of legal reforms and are hence able
to attract FDI more successfully than countries with an average economic development. For
less developed countries, also disproportional positive effects of patent protection are found.
How the effect of patent reforms interacts with pre-reform country characteristics should be
of interest for policy makers that need to forecast future FDI inflows to be able to assess the
benefits of patent reforms.
Regarding the size of a foreign affiliate, we identify circumstances under which patent
reforms significantly increase the size of affiliates. However, the results are much weaker
than for the location decision. Given that an affiliate is established in a country, the effect
of patent protection is found to play a minor role for the size of an investment. For the capital
structure of multinational firms, we find that a stronger patent protection results in higher
ownership shares held by the German parent. This is an important finding, since a higher
share of ownership is associated with lower agency costs and higher incentives to transfer
technology.
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7. Appendix
Table C.1: Definition of variables
Variable Definition and Source
Parent-level
yict Binary location variable that equals 1 if parent i holds an affiliate in host country c in
year t and zero else. Source: MiDi
Productivity Logarithm of the ratio of sales over employees. Source: MiDi
Parent-sector-level
R&D Expenditures for innovation over total sales among German industries. Source: Centre
for European Economic Research (ZEW)
PATEFF Perception-based measure of the effectiveness of patents for protecting product
innovation. Source: Cohen et al. (2000)
Affiliate-level
Log(Sales) Logarithm of affiliate sales. Source: MiDi
Log(FDI) Stock of direct investment (IMF/OECD method, see Lipponer (2006) for details).
Source: MiDi
Log(Employees) Logarithm of total number of an affiliate’s employees. Source: MiDi
Ownership share Share of affiliate’s equity held by German parent. Source: MiDi
Fixed/Total Assets Fixed over total assets. Source: MiDi
Profitability Profit over total assets. Source: MiDi
Country-level
PAT Index of patent protection that covers the five categories extent of coverage,
membership in international patent agreements, duration of protection, enforcement
mechanisms and provisions for loss of patent protection. The categories are scored
with values ranging from 0-1 and an unweighted sum (0-5) is constructed. Source:
Park (2008); Ginarte and Park (1997)
PERC-IPR Perception-based index of intellectual property right protection, 1-7 (best). Source:
World Economic Forum
Corporate Tax Statutory corporate tax rate. Sources: Various issues of corporate tax guides of
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Coopers&Lybrand, Ernst&Young and information
from the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD)
Schooling Share of pupils that progress to secondary school. Source: World Bank Development
Indicator
Log(GDPpc) Logarithm of GDP per capita. Source: World Bank Development Indicator
Exports Exports of goods and services as a share of GDP. Source: World Bank Development
Indicator
Rule of Law Rule of Law (property rights, freedom from corruption). Source: Heritage Foundation
Trade Openness Open Markets (trade freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom). Source:
Heritage Foundation
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Table C.2: Patent protection across countries
Country Mean SD Country Mean SD Country Mean SD
Algeria 2.96 0.19 Guyana 1.41 0.33 Pakistan 1.99 0.54
Argentina 3.56 0.72 Honduras 2.58 0.59 Panama 2.91 1.26
Australia 4.17 0.00 Hong Kong 3.51 0.53 Paraguay 2.27 0.69
Austria 4.29 0.07 Hungary 4.19 0.27 Peru 3.12 0.34
Bangladesh 1.87 0.00 India 2.42 1.27 Philippines 3.57 0.88
Belgium 4.63 0.08 Indonesia 2.27 0.63 Poland 3.86 0.38
Bolivia 3.08 0.61 Iran 1.91 0.00 Portugal 4.03 0.52
Brazil 2.89 1.22 Ireland 4.49 0.31 Romania 3.80 0.33
Bulgaria 4.06 0.72 Israel 3.80 0.57 Russian Federation 3.61 0.12
Cameroon 2.46 0.52 Italy 4.56 0.20 Saudi Arabia 2.21 0.66
Canada 4.56 0.19 Jamaica 3.09 0.25 Senegal 2.34 0.52
Chile 4.16 0.21 Japan 4.59 0.14 Slovak Republic 3.38 0.72
China 3.10 0.98 Jordan 2.51 1.26 Spain 4.29 0.07
Columbia 3.35 0.53 Kenya 2.84 0.40 Sweden 4.50 0.07
Congo 2.40 0.60 South Korea 4.12 0.22 Switzerland 4.29 0.07
Costa 2.45 0.77 Lithuania 3.39 0.66 Tanzania 2.53 0.18
Cyprus 3.25 0.40 Luxembourg 4.06 0.14 Thailand 2.53 0.13
Czech Republic 3.50 0.73 Malaysia 3.07 0.39 Trinidad and Tobago 3.24 0.79
Democratic Congo 1.86 0.33 Malta 2.75 1.01 Tunisia 2.41 0.80
Denmark 4.63 0.08 Marocco 2.79 0.90 Turkey 3.56 0.79
Egypt 2.12 0.57 Mauritius 2.14 0.37 USA 4.88 0.00
El Salvator 3.36 0.13 Mexico 3.57 0.38 Uganda 2.94 0.08
Ethiopia 1.38 1.19 Mozambique 1.26 1.17 Ukraine 3.68 0.00
Finland 4.54 0.13 Nepal 1.92 0.23 United Kingdom 4.54 0.00
France 4.63 0.08 Netherlands 4.63 0.08 Uruguay 2.91 0.73
Ghana 3.11 0.26 New Zealand 4.01 0.00 Venezuela 3.15 0.29
Greece 3.91 0.42 Nigeria 2.97 0.18 Vietnam 2.94 0.08
Guatemala 1.84 1.14 Norway 4.14 0.15 Zambia 1.77 0.16
Overall mean 3.24
Overall standard deviation 1.03
Between standard deviation 0.93
Within standard deviation 0.46
Notes: The Table presents the country means for the time-varying Ginarte-Park index of patent protection.
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Table C.3: Industry characteristics
NACE 1 Code Industry R&D PATEFF
1500 Manufacture of food products, beverages 1.40 18.26
1600 Manufacture of tobacco products 1.37 -
1700 Manufacture of textiles 1.94 20.00
1800 Manufacture of textile products 1.95 -
1900 Manufacture of leather, leather products 1.92 -
2000 Manufacture of wood, wood products 3.16 -
2100 Manufacture of pulp, paper, paper products 3.13 36.94
2200 Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded media 3.16 12.08
2300 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 4.64 33.33
2400 Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products 4.44 37.46
2440 Manufacture of pharmaceutical products 4.20 50.20
2500 Manufacture of rubber, plastic products 3.65 32.71
2600 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 2.92 21.11
2700 Manufacture of basic metals 2.74 20.00
2800 Manufacture of metal products 2.74 39.43
2900 Manufacture of machinery, equipment n.e.c. 4.80 42.94
3000 Manufacture of office machinery, computers 6.90 41.00
3100 Manufacture of electrical machinery, apparatus 6.85 34.55
3200 Manufacture of radio, television, communication equipment and apparatus 7.21 25.82
3300 Manufacture of medical, precision, optical instruments, watches and clocks 8.23 40.43
3400 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers 6.84 43.09
3500 Manufacture of other transport equipment 6.07 -
3510 Building, repairing of ships, boats 7.94 -
3520 Manufacture of railed vehicles 7.94 -
3530 Manufacture of aircraft, spacecraft 7.94 32.92
3540 Manufacture of motorcycles, bicycles, invalid 7.94 -
3550 Manufacture of other transport equipment 7.94 -
3600 Manufacture of furniture, Manufactureacturing 2.60 33.81
3700 Recycling 2.62 -
4000 Electricity, gas, steam, hot water supply 0.60 -
Industry average 4.41 32.43
Industry standard deviation 2.40 9.93
Notes: The Table presents the values for the time-constant measure of patent effectiveness (PATEFF) and
the mean values for the time-varying measures of R&D intensity (R&D). All definitions of the variable are
summarized in Table C.1.
Table C.4: Entry decision (with country-year FE)
Dependent variable: Location
(1) (2)
Productivity 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0013)
PAT*PATEFF 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001)
PAT*R&D 0.0020∗∗∗
(0.0004)
R&D -0.0078∗∗∗
(0.0018)
Observations 261434 275373
Indiv. Parents 2490 2630
Destinations 84 84
Adjusted R2 0.1958 0.1943
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by parent firm,
with ***, **, * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and
10% levels respectively. The dependent variable is
the binary location variable yict that equals 1 if parent
i holds an affiliate in host country c in year t. All
specifications include country-year, year and parent
fixed effects.
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Table C.6: Ownership (with country-year FE)
Dependent variable: Ownership Share
(1) (2)
Productivity -0.0027 -0.0018
(0.0033) (0.0031)
Log(Sales) 0.0030 0.0024
(0.0030) (0.0029)
Profitability -0.0253 -0.0313∗
(0.0180) (0.0166)
Fix/Total Assets -0.0157 -0.0153
(0.0161) (0.0155)
PAT*PATEFF -0.0002
(0.0002)
R&D 0.0112
(0.0110)
PAT*R&D -0.0018
(0.0024)
Observations 10330 10904
Indiv. Parents 2393 2525
Destinations 72 73
Adjusted R2 0.3178 0.3207
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by parent
firm, with ***, **, * denoting significance at 1%,
5% and 10% levels respectively. All specifications
include country-year, year and parent fixed effects.
Additionally, dummies for an affiliate’s age and sector
are included.
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Table C.8: Entry decision with perception-based IPR index
Dependent variable: Location decision
(1) (2) (3)
Productivity 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Log(GDPpc) 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0106∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Corporate Tax -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Schooling 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Exports 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Rule of Law -0.0001∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Trade Openness -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
PERC-IPR 0.0032∗∗∗ -0.0102∗∗∗ -0.0034∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0027) (0.0016)
PERC-IPR*PATEFF 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001)
PERC-IPR*R&D 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0003)
R&D -0.0052∗∗∗
(0.0012)
Observations 657031 601315 631966
Indiv. Parents 2226 2026 2140
Destinations 98 98 98
Adjusted R2 0.1742 0.1815 0.1774
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by parent firm, with ***, **, * denoting
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The dependent variable is
the binary location variable yict that equals 1 if parent i holds an affiliate in
host country c in year t. All specifications include country, year and parent
fixed effects. The sample covers the years 2006-2010.
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Table C.10: Ownership share of foreign affiliates with perception-based IPR index
Dependent variable: Ownership Share
(1) (2) (3)
Productivity -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0012
(0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0028)
Log(GDPpc) -0.0049 -0.0023 -0.0067
(0.0139) (0.0132) (0.0136)
Corporate Tax -0.0013∗∗ -0.0013∗∗ -0.0014∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
School System -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Exports -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Rule of Law -0.0012∗∗∗ -0.0011∗∗∗ -0.0011∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Trade Openness 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
PERC-IPR 0.0028 0.0207 0.0167∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0142) (0.0071)
PERC-IPR*PATEFF -0.0005
(0.0003)
PERC-IPR*R&D -0.0026∗∗∗
(0.0009)
R&D 0.0131∗∗∗
(0.0046)
Observations 24816 22965 23957
Indiv. Parents 2177 1981 2093
Destinations 84 82 84
Adjusted R2 0.4738 0.4670 0.4739
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by parent firm, with ***, **, * denoting
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All specifications
include country, year and parent fixed effects. Additionally, dummies for
an affiliate’s age and sector are included. The sample covers the years
2006-2010.
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